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ONLY A LITTLE BIT PREGNANT:
THE PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION ACT
FROM A PERFORMER'S PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1978, Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
("PDA"). I The explicit purpose of the Act was to prohibit discrimination
by employers on the basis of pregnancy.2 Nineteen years later, employers
are still insisting pregnancy is a condition "unique to women"3 that
precludes them from employment in the workplace.4
The continuing attitude that pregnant women are unfit to work is
especially apparent in the entertainment industry where producers continue
to discharge actresses from their jobs when they become pregnant.5 The
recent firing of actress Hunter Tylo exemplifies the discriminatory
treatment actresses often confront if they desire to continue working while
pregnant.6
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994).
2. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
3. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 139 (1976). In Gilbert, Justice Rehnquist
reasoned that excluding pregnancy-related disabilities from a state disability insurance plan did
not impose an additional burden on women not imposed on men. The plan merely did not
extend an additional benefit to pregnant women. Pregnancy disability was an extra risk "unique
to women" and its exclusion from a California state disability insurance plan did not create
unequal treatment of the sexes. Id.
4. E.g., Metz v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 39 F.3d 1482 (10th Cir. 1994)
(account executive successfully sues for pregnancy discrimination after being fired); Hayes v.
Shelby Mem'l Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984) (x-ray technician successfully sued for
pregnancy discrimination); Ex- Worker Sues over Pregnancy, ROANOKE TIMES & WORLD NEWS,
Aug. 3, 1996, at Cl (alleging that an airline ticket clerk was fired because the airline did not
want someone "swollen and bloated" working behind the counter); Nancy Hass, Read This
Before You Go on Maternity Leave; CNN Correspondent Patti Paniccia Lost Her Job Shortly
After the Birth of Her Second Child, REDBOOK, July 1996, at 51.
5. See Tylo v. Spelling Ent. Group, Inc., No. BC149844 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 13,
1996); Robert W. Butler, Richardson Talks About 'Kansas,' AUSTIN AM.-STATESMAN, Apr. 21,
1995, at E7 (recounting that when Kim Basinger was forced to withdraw from filming Kansas
City because of her pregnancy, the casting director revealed that replacing a "star" is not
unusual); Pam Lambert et al., Bringing up Babies, PEOPLE, July 8, 1996, at 84 (presenting
actress Connie Selleca's claim that the producers canceled the television series Second Chances
when she and another actress on the show disclosed they were pregnant).
6. Tylo, No. BC 149844 at 5.
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On May 13, 1996, daytime soap star Hunter Tylo filed suit in Los
Angeles Superior Court alleging pregnancy discrimination against Spelling
Entertainment Group, Spelling Television, Inc., and Executive Producer
Frank South ("Spelling"). According to the Complaint, on February 16,
1996, Tylo entered into a contract with Spelling to appear on Melrose
Place for the 1996-97 season. 8 However, on April 10, 1996, one month
after informing Spelling that she was pregnant, Tylo was fired.
9
Tylo maintains that she was terminated "solely because of her
pregnancy in violation of ... her right to be free of pregnancy
discrimination. ... 10 She contends that at the time she was terminated no
specific character had been developed for her on Melrose Place and that
Spelling made no effort to contact her concerning "her pregnancy, her
delivery date, or whether any accommodation would be necessary."" I
Spelling maintains that the agreement with Tylo gave Spelling a
contractual right to terminate her if there was a "material change in [her]
appearance, and because Tylo's pregnancy would cause such a change,
her termination was justified.' 3  Spelling contends Tylo was engaged to
play the part of a married woman who has an affair with another character
on Melrose Place, and Tylo's pregnancy would not conform to the
character she had been hired to portray.'
4
This case represents much more than a disagreement over the terms
of an employment contract. Spelling's firing of Tylo raises questions
about the resiliency of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act as a legal remedy
to protect women from discriminatory employment policies based on their
reproductive role. If these protections can be suspended simply because
7. Id. Tylo sued under California law claiming pregnancy discrimination. CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 12945 (West 1992). For purposes of this Comment, the claims are analyzed under
federal law using the Tylo case as a factual premise. California law is similar except it provides
for a more generous pregnancy leave of up to four months. Id. § 12945(b)(2); see also
California Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). In addition, there is no
comparable exception to pregnancy discrimination for "authenticity or genuineness," so under
California law Tylo is not subject to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
"authenticity exception." See 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(2) (1996).
8. Tylo, No. BC149844 at4.
9. Id. at 5.
10. Id. at 6, 8.
11. Id. at 5.
12. Letter from Cortez Smith, Senior Counsel, Spelling Entertainment Group, Inc., to




ONLY A LITTLE BIT PREGNANT
pregnancy is thought to be incompatible with a job, then they are
dangerously unreliable.
Reliable legal protection is especially important in the entertainment
industry because many producers continue to believe that pregnancy is a
wholly unprotected classification.15 Even the filing of the discrimination
suit by Tylo has prompted assertions that actresses are not entitled to the
same protections that other female employees enjoy.' 6 As one columnist
pronounced when discussing the Tylo case, "Firing a secretary, college
professor or engineer just because she's pregnant is discriminatory; firing
an actress whose pregnancy would be incompatible with the role she's
playing may be unfortunate, but, in this case, it makes sense."'
17
Hollywood expects a pregnant actress to take temporary retirement for the
duration of the pregnancy even though it may cause serious set-backs to, if
not the permanent collapse of, her career.
Although some pregnant actresses have retained their jobs through
the benevolence of producers or their personal negotiating power,
pregnancy remains a condition to be feared, avoided, and discouraged due
to the substantial burden placed on the actress. In a society that legally
15. Showbiz Today (CNN television broadcast, Aug. 20, 1996) [hereinafter Showbiz Today:
Aug. 20, 1996]; Pamela Warrick, Acting on a Legality, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 12, 1996, at El
(explaining that although Demi Moore managed to maintain her career through three
pregnancies, other less famous performers "have trouble finding any work at all when they are
obviously, or even a little bit, with child"); see also Michael Fleming, Naked Truth: CAA's
Lovett Leaves It for Camera, DAILY VARIETY, Sept. 7, 1995, at 27 (noting that normally a
pregnant client is a manager's "worst nightmare").
16. See Loraine O'Connell, When Feminist Ideology Is Taken to the Extreme, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, June 7, 1996, at El.
17. Id. (emphasis added).
18. See Showbiz Today (CNN television broadcast, May 12, 1995) (discussing pregnancy
leave as a constraint on a career) [hereinafter Showbiz Today: May 12, 1995]; see also Michael
Fleming, 'SNL's' Michaels Teams with Jagger for 'Enigma,' VARIETY, Nov. 20, 1995, at 2
(asserting that studios worry about insurance coverage when an actress becomes pregnant);
James Ryan, Brainy Siren, Now a Mom, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12, 1995, § 2, at 19 (discussing how
pregnancy prevented Annette Bening from portraying Catwoman in Batman Returns and the
principal part in Disclosure).
19. See Everybody Still Knows Her Name, THE PHOENIX GAzETTE, Mar. 7, 1995, at DI
(reporting how the executive producer of The X-Files allowed actress Gillian Anderson to retain
her job despite her pregnancy); Ann Hodges, '90210' Gets Another Year Older, Bolder, Hous.
CHRON., Sept. 5, 1994, at I (recounting the producers' assent to including Gabrielle Carteris'
pregnancy into the plot line); Showbiz Today: May 12, 1995, supra note 18 (acknowledging that
actress Jessica Lange can take pregnancy leave and still find work in her later years).
20. See Showbiz Today: May 12, 1995, supra note 18 (recognizing that choosing between
a career and starting a family can often be an agonizing choice); see also Gloria Allred,
Statement to the Press 2-4 (May 13, 1996) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Entertainment Law Journal). Tylo's attorney, Gloria Allred, details the potential burdens on an
actress who becomes pregnant by contending that women should not have to choose between
1997]
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and morally professes to encourage childbirth over abortion, 2 1 it is
contradictory to enforce employment policies that require an actress to
choose between continuing her pregnancy or sacrificing her job.
22
Despite the difficulty and uncertainty that confronts a pregnant
performer, many actresses have successfully continued to perform
throughout their pregnancies. 2 3 These women demonstrate that pregnancy
is not inherentl' incompatible with acting and can be easily accommodated
in many cases. Their success supports the notion that the entertainment
industry should not be exempted from the prohibitions against pregnancy.. . . 25 •
discrimination. As actress Marilu Henner confirmed, "I've been not
pregnant, playing pregnant. I've been playing not pregnant, but pregnant.
And I've been playing pregnant when I was pregnant. And I can tell you,
it all comes down to costuming and camera angles .... 26
This Comment argues that discrimination based on pregnancy is not
inherently justified in the entertainment industry. Part II presents an
overview of the current legal prohibitions on pregnancy discrimination and
the alternative theories for pursuing a discrimination claim under Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"). 27 Part III contends that the
entertainment industry is not exempt from Title VII prohibitions on
pregnancy discrimination when an actress' pregnancy can be effectively
disguised, allowing her to perform a role. Part IV discusses the burden to
employers and the extent to which they must accommodate a pregnant
actress. In addition, Part IV argues that the negative implications
potentially associated with pregnancy are not sufficient to justify
discrimination. Part V examines the contractual provisions that may
potentially allow a producer to circumvent the more rigorous legal
having a baby and keeping their job or tolerate economic or social "punishment" because they
are pregnant. Id.
21. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Harris v. McRae,
448 U.S. 297 (1980).
22. See Gloria Allred, Statement to the Press, supra note 20, at 4 (contending that "big
business" should not be allowed to "veto a pregnancy by terminating the potential mother from
her job...").
23. Daniel Howard Cerone, A Surreal 'X-Files' Captures Earthlings, L.A. TIMEs, Oct. 28,
1994, at FI (explaining how actress Gillian Anderson used props to disguise her pregnancy
while filming the television series The X-Files); Showbiz Today: Aug. 20, 1996, supra note 15
(stating that actress Phylicia Rashad hid her pregnancy during filming of the Cosby Show); see
generally Warrick, supra note 15, at El (noting that actress Shelley Long's pregnant form was
hidden behind the Cheers bar during filming of the popular television series). See also infra
Part III.A-B.
24. See discussion infra Part III.A.
25. Id.
26. Warrick, supra note 15, at El.
27. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994).
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standards intended to protect pregnant employees. Finally, Part VI
examines the balancing of interests required under Title VII and argues
that the scales should tip in favor of protecting the jobs of pregnant
actresses.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Pregnancy: A Protected Class
When Title VII was originally enacted, it prohibited sex
discrimination in employment, but pregnancy was not explicitly included28
as a protected class. However, when the Supreme Court held that
pregnancy discrimination was not prohibited as sex discrimination,
Congress disagreed. 29  The legislators nullified the Court's decision by
amending Title VII in 1978 to include the PDA. The PDA expands the
Title VII definition of discrimination based on sex to include
discrimination based on "pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions."
3'
28. "It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer ... to discharge any
individual ... because of such individual's ... sex . I..." Id. § 2000e-2(a)(l). "The drafters of
the bill originally sought to prohibit discrimination only on the basis of race, and opponents who
sought to 'sink the bill under gales of laughter' added sex as a prohibited category of
discrimination on the House floor." Sally J. Kenney, Pregnancy Discrimination: Toward
Substantive Equality, 10 Wis. WOMEN's L.J. 351, 359-60 (1995) (quoting CAROLYN BIRD,
BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN DOWN 5 (1968)).
29. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 3 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749. The
House Committee Report reveals Congress's dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court's decisions
in General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) and Nashville Gas Co. v. Satty, 434 U.S.
136 (1977), which established an ambiguous test for determining sex discrimination based on
pregnancy.
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k).
31. The relevant portion of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act reads:
The terms 'because of sex' or 'on the basis of sex' include, but are not limited to,
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions;
and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall
be treated the same for all employment-related purposes, including receipt of
benefits under fringe benefit programs, as other persons not so affected but similar
in their ability or inability to work, and nothing in §703(h) of this title shall be
interpreted to permit otherwise.
1997]
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B. Alternative Theories of Pregnancy Discrimination:
Disparate Treatment versus Disparate Impact
Discrimination claims brought under Title VII are analyzed under
either a disparate treatment or disparate impact theory. 32How the case is
classified determines an employer's available defenses. Discrimination
based on "disparate treatment" occurs when an employment policy facially
discriminates against a class of employees protected under Title VII. 33 If
the employment policy is facially neutral but disproportionately burdens




Courts consider an employment policy that explicitly discriminates
on the basis of a protected characteristic as facially discriminatory and in
"direct contravention ... [of] Title VII's statutory prohibitions."35 Since
the enactment of the PDA, policies that explicitly discriminate on the basis
of pregnancy are considered a "prima facie violation of [T]itle VII."
36
Under Title VII, an employer may discriminate in hiring and
employment if the employer can show that one of these prohibited
categories is a "bona fide occupational qualification ["BFOQ"]." 37 The
BFOQ exception3 8 provides that in certain circumstances, a business'
"personnel [may be] qualified on [the] basis of religion, sex, or national
origin." 39  Therefore, the BFOQ exception presumably exempts explicit
32. Kenney, supra note 28, at 367.
33. Sheryl Rosensky Miller, From the Inception to the Aftermath of International Union,
UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.: Achieving its Potential to Advance Women's Employment
Rights, 43 CATH. U. L. REv. 227, 244-46 (1993).
34. Id. at 235-37.
35. Id. at 244.
36. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10 (1996).
37. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1994). Specifically, the statute states:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful
employment practice for an employer to hire and employ employees . .. on the
basis of his [or her] ... sex ... in those certain instances where ... sex ... is a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of that particular business or enterprise ....
Id.
38. Although a BFOQ is commonly referred to as an exception to Title VII, it is more
accurately described as a justification for discrimination based on sex. Michael L. Sirota, Sex
Discrimination: Title VII and the Bona Fide Occupational Qualification, 55 TEX. L. REv. 1025,
1026 (1977).
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
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discrimination based on pregnancy only if nonpregnancy is essential to the
company's primary function as a business.
40
2. Disparate Impact
The disparate impact analysis applies when a facially neutral
employment Rractice disproportionately excludes pregnant women from
employment. A prima facie case of discrimination based on disparate
impact is established once the plaintiff proves that an employer's facially
neutral policy or procedure adversely affects a class of employees
protected under Title VII. 42 The burden then shifts to the employer, who
must show that the discriminatory requirement is "job related for the
position in question and consistent with business necessity."43 Even if the
employer shows that such a requirement is a business necessity,4 the
plaintiff may still prevail if she can show that the discriminatory policy is
not necessary because other, less discriminatory policies would "serve the
employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.'
The disparate impact approach was first recognized by the Supreme
Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.46 The Court prohibited employment
practices that "disqualiffied] Negroes at a substantially higher rate than
white applicants ... ."47 The Duke Power Company in Griggs required
standardized test scores and high school diplomas as a condition of
employment for four of the five departments. 48 The departments requiring
the test scores and diplomas were comprised exclusively of white
employees, and the lowest paying job in those four departments paid more
than the highest paying job in the fifth department.49  The plaintiffs
successfully challenged the practice by establishing that the test scores had
no correlative relationship to the performance of the job.50 The Court held
40. Id.; see also International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200
(1991) (holding that explicit discrimination can only be defended as a bona fide occupational
qualification).
41. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 329 (1977).
42. Note, The Civil Rights Act of 1991: The Business Necessity Standard, 106 HARV. L.
REV. 896, 898 (1993) [hereinafter Business Necessity Standard].
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
44. Id.
45. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. at 329 (citations omitted).
46. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
47. Id. at 425-26.
48. Id. at 427.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 431-32.
1997]
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that "practices, procedures, or tests neutral on their face ... cannot be
maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory
employment practices. An examination of the legislative history of the
Civil Rights Act led the Court to maintain that "Congress has placed on the
employer the burden of showing that any given requirement must have a
manifest relationship to the employment in question."52 Therefore, under
the disparate impact analysis, a neutral practice that disproportionately
burdens members of a protected class can be challenged as discrimination
in violation of Title VII.5 3 However, employers may justify the policy if
they establish that the policy is necessary to the efficient functioning of the
business.
54
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Wards Cove Packing
Co. v. Atonio55 significantly narrowed the scope of the disparate impact
analysis by requiring that the plaintiff retain the burden of proof at all
phases. 56  The plaintiff had to establish that there was no business
necessity that justified the discriminatory practice, a requirement often not
within the scope of the plaintiffs evidentiary findings. The decision also
lowered the standard for establishing a business necessity. 58 Although the
Court acknowledged that the disputed policy must have a "significant"
application to achieving the aims of the enterprise, it removed any
requirement that the practice be "essential" or "indispensable" to the
operation of the employer's business.
59
The Civil Rights Act of 199160 returned to the employer the burden
of proving the business necessity defense. Although the Act does not
explicitly define what constitutes a business necessity, its purpose is "to
codify the concepts of 'business necessity' and 'job related' expressed by
the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.... ,"61 Presumably, as in
Griggs, the standard places the burden on the employer to show that any
requirement of the job must "have a manifest relationship to the
51. Id. at 430.
52. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
53. MARK A. ROTHSTEIN ET AL., EMPLOYMENT LAW § 3.20 (1994).
54. Id. § 3.24.
55. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
56. Id. at 659 (quoting Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 997 (1988)).
57. Business Necessity Standard, supra note 42, at 899.
58. Wards Cove Packing, 490 U.S. at 659.
59. Id.
60. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
61. Id. § 1, 105 Stat. at 1071.
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employment in question," 62 emphasizing that "[t]he touchstone is business
necessity.
" 63
III. PREGNANCY DISCRIMINATION: ARE ACTRESSES
EXCEPTED FROM TITLE VII PROTECTION?
Hunter Tylo contracted to portray a character on Melrose Place in
February of 1996.64 One month later she learned she was pregnant and
subsequently notified Spelling. 65 Spelling responded by terminating her
contract, claiming her pregnancy did "not conform" to the character she•6
was hired to play. The direct inference is that Tylo was fired because she
was pregnant.
By premising Tylo's dismissal on her pregnancy, Spelling clearly
violated Title VII under the disparate treatment theory. 67 Spelling can
only justify Tylo's dismissal by establishing that nonpregnancy is a BFOQ
for the job,68 and there is no established precedent for determining whether
nonpregnancy is a BFOQ for acting in a television series.69 However, the
courts have provided some guidance in applying the BFOQ standard in
two related areas: sex discrimination premised on a need for authenticity
and genuineness in artistic productions, and sex discrimination based on
the potential to become pregnant. Therefore, an analysis of Spelling's
BFOQ defense can be based on these analogous judicial interpretations of
the BFOQ justification.
A. A Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Premised on a Need for Authenticity
The authenticity exception originates in the "Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination Because of
Sex.'70 The Guidelines state, "[w]here it is necessary for the purpose of
62. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971).
63. Id. at 431.
64. Tylo v. Spelling Ent. Group, Inc., No. BC149844, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 13,
1996).
65. Id. at 5.
66. Letter from Cortez Smith to Hunter Tylo, supra note 12, at 1.
67. When an employer admits that an employee was fired solely because that person is the
member of a protected class, the practice is a per se violation of Title VII. Chambers v. Omaha
Girls Club, Inc., 840 F.2d 583, 583-84 (8th Cir. 1988).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(l) (1994); see also International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 200 (1991).
69. See discussion infra Part III.A-B.
70. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(2) (1996).
1997]
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authenticity or genuineness, the Commission will consider sex to be a bona
fide occupational qualification, e.g., an actor or actress."7 1 This specific
type of BFOQ allows for a narrow exception under Title VII for
discrimination where "sexual identification is essential to the integrity of
the production." 72  The authenticity BFOQ permits producers to
discriminate in hiring women for female roles and men for male roles.
73
In addition, an advertiser would presumably be allowed to discriminate in
hiring men to demonstrate shaving products or women to model bikinis.74
An examination of the legislative history reveals that the authenticity
exception may have originally been intended to allow for more "traditional
perceptions" or stereotypical qualifications in hiring. 75  In the debate
concerning the BFOQ exception, senators argued that a BFOQ could be
established to support "the preference of a French restaurant for a French
cook, [and] ... a professional baseball team for male players."'76 However,
many commentators agree that such a liberal application of the exception
has never been challenged in the courts, and it is presently limited to
gender discrimination in casting.
77
Two cases have addressed the issue of sex-based discrimination
predicated on a need for authenticity. 78 In Button v. Rockefeller,79 a male
applicant for the position of state trooper challenged the hiring of four
females with lower test scores on the entrance examination. 8 The New
York court upheld sex as a BFOQ for discriminatory hiring based on
authenticity and genuineness. 8 1  The court reasoned that the need for
female undercover police to investigate "purse snatching and unlawful
abortion" justified the hiring of women to the exclusion of the men with
higher test scores.82
7 1. Id. The authenticity exception is sometimes referred to as the "entertainment
exception." See Patricia A. Buchman, Note, Title VII Limits on Discrimination Against
Television Anchorwomen on the Basis of Age-Related Appearance, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 190, 206
(1985).
72. BARBARA LINDEMANN SCHLEI & PAUL GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW 341 (2d ed. 1983 & Supp. 1984).
73. Buchman, supra note 71, at 206.
74. See id.
75. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 72, at 341.
76. Interpretive Memorandum of Title VII of H.R. 7152, 110 CONG. REc. 7213 (1964).
77. ROTHSTEIN, supra note 53, § 3.15; SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, supra note 72, at 341.
78. Cook v. Babbitt, 819 F. Supp. 1 (D.D.C. 1993); Button v. Rockefeller, 351 N.Y.S.2d
488 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
79. 351 N.Y.S.2d 488 (Sup. Ct. 1973).
80. Id. at 489.
81. Id. at 492-93.
82. Id. at 492. The court upheld the BFOQ stating, "it [cannot] reasonably be denied, that
ONLY A LITTLE BIT PREGNANT
A more recent district court case raises doubt about the justification
of sex-based discrimination even in cases of gender-specific roles. In
Cook v. Babbitt,83 the District Court for the District of Columbia denied
authenticity as a gender-based requirement for performances on Equal
Protection grounds.8 4  In the interest of accuracy, the National Park
Service denied a female member of a volunteer infantry the chance to
portray a male soldier in the "living history" re-enactments of the Civil
War. The court held that by allowing only men to play the male soldiers
and requiring that women be restricted to the few available female roles,
the National Park Service violated the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
86
An examination of the language of the performance agreements
revealed that the provisions referred to the gender of the participants rather
than the gender of the characters. 87  This distinction amounted to "a
gender-based classification ' 88 that would pass constitutional muster only if
"those who tried to disguise their gender for dramatic roles ... could not
do so effectively . . . ."8 The court concluded that "categorically barring
women from portraying male soldiers ... constitutes unconstitutional
discrimination against women," and it granted summary judgment for the
plaintiff.
90
Very few cases rely on the authenticity exception despite its
continued inclusion in the EEOC guidelines. Cook indicates that courts
may be reluctant to uphold authenticity as a legitimate basis for sex-based
discrimination.9 1 Some commentators even contend that the authenticity
exception is logically inconsistent with "the job of [an] actor or actress":
92
After all, the very essence of this job is to pretend to be
something one is not. All that a producer should be allowed to
require is that the pretense be convincing. Thus, it may be
'for the purpose of authenticity or genuineness' female troopers will be needed for undercover
assignments. Undercover assignment to investigate episodes of purse snatching and unlawful
abortion are just two examples of situations that would probably require a female undercover
agent." Id.
83. 819 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1993).
84. Id at 16
85. Id. at 9.
86. Id. at 14-16.
87. Id. at 15.
88. Id.
89. Cook, 819 F. Supp. at 16.
90. Id. at 28.
91. See id. at 16.
92. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YALE L.J. 1, 12 n.23 (1995).
1997]
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necessary that actors whose work will require full frontal nudity
possess the requisite genitalia or a convincing facsimile, but for
most other acting jobs it is difficult to see how sex can be
determinative, as the careers of Divine and of the many
actresses who played Hamlet, from Sarah Siddons on down,
may attest.
93
Strictly applied, the authenticity requirement would only exempt
discrimination based on pregnancy94 from Title VII protections if it is
impossible for the pregnant employee to play the role convincingly.95 The
most recent court opinion on the issue, Cook, adopted this strict view of
the authenticity exception. 96  Applying this reasoning to the Tylo case
leads to the conclusion that pregnancy can only be exempted as a BFOQ if
the woman's pregnant appearance cannot be effectively disguised. The
entertainment industry is uniquely qualified to disguise and conceal a
performer's pregnancy. While The X-Files star Gillian Anderson was
pregnant, she was filmed "talking on the phone or sitting behind a
computer, and the directors began shooting her from the bust up."
97
Despite actress Shelley Long's pregnancy, she continued as a principal
character on the situation comedy Cheers. "[The] writers camouflaged
Long's expanding girth behind the bar-and in one episode, even stuck her
character beneath the floorboards." 98 Actress Katherine Kelly Lang points
out that the producers of The Bold and the Beautiful, a daytime soap opera,
have become quite adept at disguising the recent pregnancies of several of
the show's actresses. Lang will also continue working on the show during
her pregnancy and laughs, "I guess [my character] will soon be carrying a
lot of big purses .... ,,9
93. Id.; see also Los Angeles Women's Shakespeare Company to Present All-Female
'Richard II1' March 15-April 14, PR NEWSWIRE, Mar. 6, 1996, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Wires File [hereinafter Los Angeles Women's Shakespeare Company].
94. Pregnancy is included in the expanded definition of sex as amended under the PDA.
See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994). Because a woman can become pregnant after she has been
hired, it must be assumed that if nonpregnancy qualifies as a BFOQ, the statutory exception will
be extended to firing of a pregnant employee. However, the explicit language of the statute
refers only to "hiring and employ[ment]" on the basis of sex, leaving open the argument that the
BFOQ defense was only intended to extend to situations where the distinction was between
males and females, a qualification that would presumably be apparent at the outset. See id.
§ 2000e-2(e).
95. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991); see
also Cook, 819 F. Supp. at 12; Case, supra note 92, at 12 n.23.
96. Cook, 819 F. Supp. at 15.
97. Cerone, supra note 23, at Fl.
98. Warrick, supra note 15, at El.
99. B&B's Katherine Kelly Lang Staying, SOAP OPERA DIGEST, Jan. 14, 1997, at 5.
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In addition, production companies may resort to body doubles when
the actress' figure is not right for the part. In the remake of the 1979
movie Tim, twenty-nine-year-old Shelly Michelle's body was substituted
for fifty-year-old Candice Bergen's in a scene in which Bergen's character
is strolling down the beach in a bathing suit.100 Body doubles are regularly
utilized when an actress declines to do a love scene or a scene requiring
nudity.' 0 ' A similar accommodation was feasible for Tylo during the latter
stages of her pregnancy if the script called for intimate scenes.
Because the BFOQ exception for authenticity has never been tested
as a defense to pregnancy discrimination, the precedent has not been
clearly established. However, the infrequent use of the authenticity
exception 103 coupled with the Supreme Court's inclination to limit the
scope of BFOQ exceptions l10 cast doubt on its viability as a justification
where an actress' pregnancy could have been concealed or disguised.
Therefore, if Tylo's pregnancy could have been effectively hidden while
she worked on Melrose Place, Spelling would not be able to justify
terminating her contract because the BFOQ exception would be
inapplicable. I
5
B. A Bona Fide Occupational Qualification
Premised on the Potential to Become Pregnant
The Supreme Court's most recent decision on pregnancy and the
BFOQ defense established that employers can discriminate only when
pregnant women are physically incapable of doing their job. International
Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.106 discusses the BFOQ defense in
relation to a woman's potential to become pregnant. 107 The Court struck
down a policy that barred women from jobs exposing them to high levels
of lead unless the employees could medically document that they were
infertile. 10 8 Johnson Controls, a battery manufacturing plant, contended
100. Diane Haithman, Just Perfect for the Part, L.A. TiMES, July 6, 1996, at Fl.
101. Id.
102. RoTHSTEiN, supra note 53, § 3.15.
103. See id.
104. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991)
(limiting the scope of the BFOQ inquiry to a woman's actual ability to perform the job);
Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400, 419 (1985) (a BFOQ must be based on a
showing of reasonable necessity, not merely reasonableness).
105. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204.
106. 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
107. Id.
108. Id. at 206-07.
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the policy was justified to protect a potentially developing fetus from lead
exposure. 109 The Court held that because the policy was directed at fertile
women with no comparable restriction for fertile men, the lolicy was
facially discriminatory and could only be defended as a BFOQ.
The Court determined that the factory failed to establish that
infertility was essential to the performance of the job; therefore, it held the
BFOQ defense was inapplicable. I I The Court explained that "the BFOQ
is limited to instances in which sex or pregnancy actually interferes with
the employee's ability to perform, and the employer must direct its
concerns in this regard to those aspects of the woman's job-related
activities that fall within the 'essence' of the particular business.""' The
Court recognized that in instances where pregnancy is at issue, the PDA
contains "a BFOQ standard of its own: Unless pregnant employees differ
from others 'in their ability or inability to work,' they must be 'treated the
same' as other employees 'for all employment-related purposes."'
113
The decision in Johnson Controls established that a BFOQ is only
applicable when the protected characteristic actually affects an employee's
ability to perform the job. 114 If an employee's pregnant condition is only
incidental to job performance, the discrimination is not justifiable as a
BFOQ. l 5 Therefore, in the Tylo case, the BFOQ defense hinges on the
conflicting facts asserted by T'lo and Spelling concerning the nature of the
role she was hired to portray.
1. When Pregnancy Is Incidental to Job Performance
Tylo argues that she was hired to play a female character but the
producers informed her "that no specific character for her role on Melrose
Place had been written."1 1 7 If no specific role had been established for
Tylo at the time she was hired, she has a strong argument that
nonpregnancy was not essential to the job.
1 8
109. Id. at 191.
110. Id. at 199-200.
111. Id. at 204.
112. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 188 (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333,
335 (1977)).
113. Id. at 204 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994)).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. See discussion infra Part III.B.1-2.
117. Tylo v. Spelling Ent. Group, Inc., No. BC149844, 3-4 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed May 13,
1996).
118. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204.
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There is no general requirement of nonpregnancy for an actress in a
television series. Many actresses have successfully performed a variety of
roles while pregnant by merely concealing their pregnancy from the
audience. Michelle Pfeiffer filmed Dangerous Minds while pregnant with
no problems more serious than occasional heartburn. 119  Actress Roma
Downey played an angel throughout her pregnancy in the television drama
Touched by an Angel, although pregnancy was completely incompatible
with her role as an angel. 120 Similarly, when two of the principal actresses
on the television program Cheers became pregnant, it did not affect the
consistently high ratings earned by the show. The producers chose to
camouflage Shelley Long's pregnancy with inventive staging and the use
of props, while Rhea Pearlman's pregnancy was easily incorporated into
the story line and simply became another aspect of her character, the
"ever-fertile Carla."'122
Under Johnson Controls, discrimination can only be defended as a
BFOQ if it actually interferes with the job.123 As the many examples of
working pregnant actresses show, pregnancy does not incapacitate an
actress, nor does it automatically impede a production. Therefore, if
Tylo's pregnancy would not have affected her ability to portray the
character for which she was hired, the BFOQ defense is irrelevant.
Further, if Tylo was hired to play an unspecified female character on
Melrose Place, as she contends, then her pregnancy would not
substantially interfere with her ability to perform the job for which she
contracted. 124
119. Lois Romano, The Reliable Source, WASH. POST, July 12, 1995, at D3.
120. Warrick, supra note 15, at El.
121. Bill Carter, The Tonic That Keeps "Cheers" Bubbling Along, N.Y. TtMES, Apr. 29,
1990, § 2, at 35 (stating that Cheers remained highly rated and highly regarded even after it had
been in production for several years).
122. Warrick, supra note 15, at El.
123. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
124. Some commentators have suggested that the producers of Melrose Place were less
inclined to accommodate Tylo's pregnancy because she had not yet debuted on the show at the
time she became pregnant. See O'Connell, supra note 16, at El. Such assertions imply that
pregnant actresses must rely on their personal negotiating power rather than reliable legal
protections to retain their jobs. The less established actress is precisely the employee that
requires the protection of the PDA. If employers could justify pregnancy discrimination on a
sliding scale determined by the employee's prominence in the profession, it would return the
most vulnerable women in the workforce to the unprotected status they endured prior to the
passage of the PDA.
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2. When Nonpregnancy Is Essential to Job Performance
Contradicting Tylo's claim, Spelling contends that Tylo was cast to
play a very specific character. The producers maintain that Tylo's
character was "a seemingly happily married woman who starts having
affairs.. ,,125 They assert that Tylo's pregnancy made her unable to
perform that role because the character was "by necessity not pregnant,"
126
therefore, non-pregnancy is a "proper and legal consideration" that can be
defended as a BFOQ.
127
If, as Spelling contends, the pregnancy would interfere with Tylo's
ability to perform the job for which she was hired, then the BFOQ defense• 128
becomes viable. If Spelling can show that there was no way to disguise
or conceal Tylo's pregnancy without a substantial modification of the role,
then nonpregnancy would be a BFOQ for the job.
129
For example, if the only way to accommodate Tylo's pregnancy
required rewriting the script and incorporating Tylo's pregnancy into the
story line, then Spelling was being asked to change the essential nature of
the job to accommodate Tylo's pregnancy. The PDA does not require an
employer to make special accommodations for a pregnant employee.
130
Therefore, if a specific character could not be played by a pregnant actress,
then under the applicable standards nonpregnancy is a BFOQ.
13 1
However, even though Spelling may not be required to rewrite the role for
Tylo, there remains some burden on the employer to accommodate a
pregnant actress.1
32
IV. THE BURDEN ON THE EMPLOYER OF RETAINING A PREGNANT ACTRESS
A. Equal Treatment Under the Pregnancy Discrimination Act
Some commentators have suggested that the primary issue in the Tylo
case is the extent to which a producer must accommodate a pregnant
125. Warrick, supra note 15, at El.
126. Letter from Cortez Smith to Hunter Tylo, supra note 12, at 1.
127. Warrick, supra note 15, at El.
128. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
129. Id.
130. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
131. See Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204.
132. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1994); H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 4 (1978), reprinted in
1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
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actress.133 As one attorney queried, "What burden are we going to place
on movie studios or television production companies who hire [actresses]
to accommodate [actresses] who may become pregnant, and how
unreasonable or reasonable do those steps have to be to accommodate
those roles?"'
34
The PDA establishes a basis for determining the burden on the
employer. Under the PDA's equal treatment model, 135 employers are not
required to provide special accommodations; they are only required to be
consistent. Therefore, Spelling has the right to provide or refuse to
provide accommodations as it sees fit, as long as it treats all similarly
situated actors and actresses the same. If pregnancy does not rise to the
level of a BFOQ, a comparable accommodation is achieved by any
additional concession by the producers that aids an actor or actress in
reasonably performing the role.
To avoid liability under the PDA, Spelling must establish that the
accommodations requested by Tylo substantially exceed anything that
Spelling has provided to other performers. In other words, Spelling must
show that anytime an actor or actress has been unable to perform without
special accommodations, Spelling has terminated them. However, it is
extremely unlikely that the company can establish that it is consistently so
unaccommodating.
The general practice in the industry is to provide ample
accommodations to actors and actresses in starring roles. For example,
another Spelling production was very accommodating to a pregnant
actress. When Gabrielle Carteris, who played Andrea Zuckerman on
Beverly Hills 90210, became pregnant, the producers wrote her pregnancy
into the script and even hired an additional actor to play Andrea's husband
and the fictional baby's father.
137
Furthermore, accommodations for pregnancy are not the only
relevant sources for comparison. Any additional concession to actors or
actresses that allows them to overcome a temporary impediment and
133. See Showbiz Today: Aug. 20, 1996, supra note 15.
134. Id.
135. The equal treatment theory is based on the assumption that where there is no
difference between the sexes, they should be treated the same. Where there are biological
differences between the sexes, these can be analogized to a similar condition that men have as
well. D'Andra Millsap, Comment, Reasonable Accommodation of Pregnancy in the Workplace:
A Proposal to Amend the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 32 HOUs. L. REV. 1411, 1424-26
(1996).
136. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, § 1 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
137. Hodges, supra note 19, at I.
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continue working on the production provides a basis for comparison.
38
For example, Michelle Pfeiffer's contract for the film One Fine Day
stipulated that she would only work for twelve hours a day so she could
tuck her children into bed at night, and shooting had to end prior to the
date her daughter was to begin preschool.1 39 Despite pursuing a successful
film career, George Clooney has remained a regular on the television
series ER because the ER producers "have been extraordinarily cooperative
when it comes to giving him time off to take advantage of all the good
movie offers landing on his doorstep." 140  When Kelsey Grammer
unexpectedly checked himself into the Betty Ford Center, the producers of
his television show, Frasier, began shooting scenes "piecemeal" around
the actor, allowing him to shoot his few remaining scenes upon his
return.
14 1
Based on industry practice and Spelling's prior actions, it can easily
be established that Spelling has, at some time, altered a production
schedule to accommodate an actor's schedule, adjusted camera angles to
emphasize or de-emphasize a specific physical feature, or altered a
costume for the loss or gain in a performer's weight. Any such
accommodations made by the producers of Melrose Place would require
that they provide accommodations for pregnancy. For example, consistent
accommodations would have required Spelling to begin production earlier
and shoot intimate scenes before Tylo's pregnancy became apparent.
Alternatively, it would have been necessary to delay shooting Tylo's
scenes until she returned from leave. The most feasible and generally
utilized means of handling an actress' pregnancy, though, is merely to
conceal or avoid filming the actress' developing abdomen. 42
B. The Connotations of Pregnancy:
An Unreliable Basis for Legal Precedent
The success of a television show can be significantly affected by
intangible factors such as the image it projects or the subjective
associations by the audience. Arguably, the audience's reaction to the
138. See H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
139. Duane Dudek, 'Day' and Date: Clooney and Pfeiffer Discuss Their New Movie and
Their Old Flames, PITT. POST-GAzErTE, Dec. 24, 1996, at D8.
140. Ivor David, Hollywood Buys into George Clooney's Star Power, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 3,
1997, at D.
141. Valerie Kuklenski, The Show Must Go On, UPI, Oct. 3, 1996, available in LEXIS,
News Library, Wires File.
142. See discussion supra Parts III.B.1.
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knowledge that Tylo was pregnant (even though the character was not)
should be considered when balancing the burden to the employer.
143
Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc.144 assessed an analogous
situation in which an unmarried African-American woman was fired from
her job as a camp counselor when she became pregnant because the club
felt she was not a proper role model. 45 The club premised the firing not
on her ability to function as a camp counselor, but rather on what the
employer felt Chambers' pregnancy represented. 146  Similarly, Spelling
might argue that employing a pregnant actress is inconsistent with the
Melrose Place image of sex appeal.
Although the employer openly admitted that Chambers was
discharged solely because of her pregnancy, the district court approached
the situation as a race-based disparate impact, and upheld the
discriminatory treatment as a business necessity. The court reasoned
that nonpregnancy was necessary to the job of camp counselor because it
''may well be viewed by teenage women as a 'tacit' approval by the Girls
Club of teenage pregnancies," contrary to the philosophy of the club.
148
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit concluded that although the dismissal may
actually have been explicit discrimination, the business necessity defense
established by the district court would suffice.
14 9
In a highly critical dissent to the denial of a rehearing, Senior Judge
Lay pointed out that the court sitting en banc failed to appreciate the
fundamental differences between the business necessity defense and the
BFOQ defense by holding them to be virtually interchangeable.15 0  In
addition, the circuit court discounted the Supreme Court's guidance, which
required the BFOQ defense be "inextricably connected to the essence of a
particular job."'15 1 Judge Lay contended that the circuit court's decision
endorsed the "employer's subjective beliefs without any proof whatsoever
that Chambers was unable to satisfactorily perform her duties as an arts
143. O'Connell, supra note 16, at El (arguing that Melrose Place is a popular series
because of its predictable focus on "preternaturally slim, beautiful people").
144. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 629 F. Supp. 925, 929 (D. Neb. 1986), affd, 834
F.2d 697 (8th Cir. 1987), reh'g denied, 840 F.2d 583 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 928-29.
147. Id. at 929.
148. Id. at 951.
149. Chambers v. Omaha Girls'Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 1987).
150. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 840 F.2d 583, 585 (8th Cir. 1988) (en banc)
(Lay J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 586 n.7 (emphasis omitted).
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and crafts instructor." 152 He concluded that such careless application of
the standards allowed employers to indulge in their personal biases toward
pregnancy and sex in contradiction to the precepts of the law.' 53  This
decision exemplifies the problems with allowing subjective perceptions to
provide a basis for legal discrimination. Such an unclear standard allows
for unprincipled decisions and the opportunity for employers to indulge
their individual biases about pregnancy and employment.
Analogous to the Omaha Girls Club's reluctance to retain an
unmarried pregnant woman, Spelling may not be interested in retaining a
pregnant actress because of the impact it may have on the image of the
television show. Spelling may conclude that a pregnant woman, regardless
of her ability to play the part, conveys a mature, even maternal, image that
Spelling finds inconsistent with the image of Melrose Place as "a steamy
series, featuring a cast of vixens and hunks."'
54
However, there is no clear indication that pregnancy discrimination is
defensible based on intangible notions of image or perception.15 5 Previous
assertions based on such abstract considerations have been held
inapplicable to the individual's ability to perform the job. In Johnson
Controls, potential fetal endangerment liability was held insufficient as a
basis for employment discrimination. 56 A woman could not be excluded
from the workplace merely because of a subjective assessment by the
employer that fertility was incompatible with the job.' 57  Similarly, the
Chambers decision is highly questionable because of the unprincipled
manner in which the judges reached their conclusion. By assuming
standards to reach the desired result, the circuit court evaded the essential
question of whether non-pregnancy was essential to Chambers'
152. Id. at 586.
153. Id. at 587.
154. Showbiz Today: Aug. 20, 1996, supra note 15.
155. See Chambers, 840 F.2d at 585 (Lay, J., dissenting). Relying on the Supreme Court's
guidance in Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977) and the Fifth Circuit's decision in Levin
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 730 F.2d 994, 998-99 (5th Cir. 1984), Chief Judge Lay summarized the
requirements for justifying pregnancy discrimination:
The BFOQ defense in a pregnancy discrimination case thus invokes only an
extremely narrow inquiry: (1) what are the requirements of the particular job in
question; and (2) is there objective and compelling proof that the excluded woman
is unable to perform the duties that constitute the essence of that job because of
her pregnancy.
Chambers, 840 F.2d at 585 (Lay, J., dissenting).
156. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
157. Id. at 203-04 ("[T]he BFOQ . .. is not so broad that it transforms [a] deep social
concern into an essential aspect of battery making.").
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performance as a camp counselor. 158 As Senior Judge Lay maintained,
such secondary considerations allow the employers to make employment
decisions based upon their own subjective prejudices about pregnancy.159
Such unprincipled decisions should not be tolerated and can only be
avoided if courts base their decisions on well-founded, objective criteria.
This is the lesson from Johnson Controls-pregnancy discrimination can
only be justified if it actually impedes a worker's ability to do her job.
160
Undeniably, stereotypical assessments of what pregnancy could potentially
imply are not such criteria.
Similarly, the impact of a pregnant actress on the image of a sexy
prime-time soap opera would appear to be an analogous consideration that
courts should be reluctant to uphold. Not only is such a broad extension of
the BFOQ defense inconsistent with the narrower application assessed by
the relevant cases, 161 but basing legal theory on societal perceptions is
extremely transitory and unstable. Even if an actress' pregnancy cannot be
completely disguised, the slight inconsistency that it might create with the
story line does not necessarily destroy the effectiveness of the production.
V. CONTRACTUAL RIGHT TO TERMINATE:
A MANIPULATION OF THE STANDARDS
A. A Disparate Impact Claim
Under the alternative theories for pursuing a claim of pregnancy
discrimination under Title VII, it is possible to approach Tylo's claim as
disparate impact rather than disparate treatment. Spelling, in defending its
position, is careful to point out that Tylo was discharged under a clause in
her contract, providing that she could be terminated if there was "a
material change in [her] appearance."' 62 Although Tylo's material change
is premised upon her pregnancy, actors as well as actresses would be
subject to termination if they gained or lost significant amounts of weight,
cut or grew hair, or had cosmetic surgery, for example. Therefore, the
policy is theoretically neutral in its effect.
158. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 840 F.2d 583, 585-86 (8th Cir. 1988) (Lay, J.,
dissenting).
159. Id. at 587.
160. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. at 204.
161. See supra Part III.B.; see also Western Air Lines, Inc. v Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985)
(limiting the scope of the BFOQ exception in the related area of age discrimination).
162. Letter from Cortez Smith to Hunter Tylo, supra note 12, at 1.
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If a court agrees that Tylo's claim extends from a neutral
employment policy, she must establish that the material change of
appearance clause has a disproportionately negative impact on pregnant
women.163  Tylo must show that the clause will always result in the
contractual right of the employer to terminate a woman who decides to
conceive a child, a consequence that will never be forced upon an actor
who decides to become a father.
164
The Tylo case shows just how easily an employer can shift a
discrimination case from one of disparate treatment, which can only be
defended as a BFOQ, to one of disparate impact, which is justifiable by the
less rigorous standard of a business necessity. 165  Conceivably, by
incorporating the material change of appearance clause in the contract with
Tylo, Spelling created a claim premised on disparate impact.
166
Considering that Tylo signed the contract, presumably with the advice of
counsel, it will be difficult to argue that she is not bound by its terms
unless she can establish that the clause is illegal, and therefore,
unenforceable.
To prove her claim of disparate impact, Tylo must prove that
actresses who sign similar clauses and then become pregnant are fired
more often than performers who are not pregnant and are fired under these
clauses. 167 Establishing such a claim would require data and statistical
analysis of practices in the entertainment industry to prove that such a
disparate impact has occurred. For example, in Griggs, the Supreme Court
relied on North Carolina census statistics and test results compiled by the
EEOC. 16 8 In Chambers, the court relied on county statistics on birth rates
within certain age groups to establish that unmarried, African-American
women would be affected in greater proportions by the role model rule
imposed by the Omaha Girls Club. For Tylo, compiling data on the
termination rates of pregnant actresses who have signed contracts
containing material change of appearance clauses could be extremely
difficult and even financially prohibitive.
170
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(c) (1996).
164. Id.
165. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994); see International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 188 (1991) (asserting that the business necessity standard in disparate
impact cases is a less stringent standard than required by the BFOQ defense).
166. See Letter from Cortez Smith to Hunter Tylo, supra note 12, at 1.
167. Business Necessity Standard, supra note 42, at 898.
168. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 n.6 (1971).
169. Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club, Inc., 834 F.2d 697, 701 n.12 (8th Cir. 1987).
170. Performers' unions do collect statistical data to track casting based on race and
gender. However, they do not regularly tract the existence of material change clauses in
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Assuming that Tylo was successful in establishing a prima facie case
of disparate impact, Spelling could defend the practice by arguing that
consistent appearance is a business necessity. 17 To justify an employment
policy that disproportionately impacts a protected group, the employer
must establish that there is a "demonstrable relationship [between the
policy and the] successful performance of the job for which it was
used." 72 The Supreme Court has maintained that the business necessity
standard is not as narrowly defined as the BFOQ standard. 7 3 However,
since the standard was codified in the Civil Rights Act of 1991,174 there
has been no definitive clarification of its requirements.
175
Nevertheless, the relevant considerations in applying the business
necessity standard to a claim of pregnancy discrimination by an actress
appear comparable to the BFOQ argument. Both standards require that the
producer establish that nonpregnancy is necessary to the production.
Therefore, the same arguments are applicable as discussed in relation to
the BFOQ defense. Tylo must establish that by disguising her pregnancy
she could have adequately performed the role for which she was hired.
B. Disparate Impact Remedies: A Violation of the PDA
Unfortunately, there are indications that disparate impact claims in
pregnancy discrimination suits may not be readily upheld by the courts.
The remedy for an employment policy that uniformly applies to all
employees but disproportionately discriminates against pregnant workers
potentially requires special accommodations for pregnancy. Providing
such a remedy conflicts with the PDA's explicit pronouncement that
preferential treatment for pregnancy is not required. For example, in
Troupe v. May Department Stores Co.,177 Kimberly Troupe brought a
claim of pregnancy discrimination when she was terminated the day before
pregnant actresses' contracts. E.g., Screen Actors Guild Casting Data Report, Screen Actors
Guild Television Agreement of 1989 for Independent Producers, Exhibit G at 160-61.
171. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (1994).
172. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
173. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 198 (1991).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).
175. Business Necessity Standard, supra note 42, at 910.
176. See Melissa Feinberg, Note, After California Federal Savings & Loan Association v.
Guerra: The Parameters of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act, 31 ARIZ. L. REv. 141, 151-52
(1989) (maintaining that if the Supreme Court follows the equal treatment premise contained in
the legislative history, disparate impact claims for leave and benefit policies may not be
successful).
177. 20 F.3d 734 (7th Cir. 1994).
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she was to begin her maternity leave. 17  Troupe worked as a saleswoman
during her first trimester and suffered severe morning sickness. 179 She
asked for, and was placed on, part-time status, but she still arrived late or
left early on twenty-three separate occasions between February and
June. 18  After several warnings, the store terminated her due to her
excessive tardiness. 181 Troupe brought a pregnancy discrimination suit,
contending that she was fired because the store management did not
believe that she would return to work and it did not want to pay her
benefits during her maternity leave.
8 2
The court found the policy facially neutral, and failed to consider the
possibility that a dismissal policy for excessive tardiness or absenteeism
would have a disparate impact on pregnant women. 1 3 As a result, the
court granted summary judgment against Troupe on two grounds. First,
Troupe presented no statistical evidence of the policy's disproportionate
effect on pregnant women to support a pregnancy discrimination claim.
Second, the PDA does not require preferential treatment of pregnant
workers, and there was no showing that other temporarily disabled workers
were excused under the policies regarding tardiness.
84
The only remedy available to Troupe would have been to excuse her
tardiness because she was temporarily disabled by her pregnancy.
However, excusing Troupe would constitute special treatment. The
employer would be making a concession not extended to other temporarily
disabled employees. Therefore, the disparate impact of the company's
tardiness policy on pregnant women could never be reconciled with the
requirements of the PDA.
185
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the contradiction
between the PDA and a remedy for disparate impact, in California Federal
Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra,' the Court confirmed the equal
treatment premise underlying the PDA. Justice Marshall, writing for the
Court, agreed with the conclusion that Congress intended the PDA to be "a
178. Id. at 735-36.
179. Id. at 735.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 736.
183. Troupe, 20 F.3d at 738. The court acknowledged that other courts had recognized
pregnancy discrimination based on disparate impact but dismissed it here stating, "properly
understood, disparate impact as a theory of liability is a means of dealing with the residues of
past discrimination, rather than a warrant for favoritism." Id.
184. Id. at 738-39.
185. See Feinberg, supra note 176, at 151-52.
186. 479 U.S. 272 (1987).
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floor beneath which pregnancy disability benefits may not drop-not a
ceiling above which they may not rise."' 187 However, the Court reiterated
that the PDA did not require employers to institute "any new programs
where none currently exist."' 188 The implication, therefore, is that in cases
of disparate impact, the Court will be unwilling to require employers to
implement additional protections for pregnant employees to equalize the
disparate effect of a policy.
189
Under a disparate impact claim, Tylo would be combating the same
obstacles that Troupe could not overcome in her pregnancy discrimination
suit, probably with no greater success. First, it is unlikely that Tylo would
be able to compile the statistical data required to prove disparate impact.
Second, the remedy would require that Spelling exempt her from the
termination clause, resulting in special treatment not extended to other
employees and, hence, not required by the PDA.
190
VI. A BALANCING OF INTERESTS
In every employment situation, the employer and employee have
competing interests that require balancing. Consistent with this notion,
Congress enacted the Pregnancy Discrimination Act because job security
is sufficiently important to tip the balance in favor of the pregnant
employee in the workplace.19 ' The only additional balancing that is
required in this instance relates to who should bear the burden of coping
with the inevitable changes in appearance caused by pregnancy. The
choices available to the actress are the same as those of any other pregnant
employee left without reliable legal securities. She can terminate the
pregnancy to retain her job or contend with sudden unemployment and the
uncertainty it includes. 2 Undeniably, being unemployed and pregnant is
a serious problem for a woman in any profession.
It is equally apparent that requiring producers to provide
accommodations for an actress' pregnancy so that she can continue to
perform places a burden on the employer. Changing shooting schedules,
adjusting camera angles, altering costumes, and positioning props can be
187. Id. at 280 (quoting California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 758 F.2d 390, 396
(9th Cir. 1985)).
188. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749.
189. See Millsap, supra note 135, at 1422; see also Feinberg, supra note 176, at 151. But
see California Fed. & Loan Ass 'n, 479 U.S. at 292 (Stevens, J., concurring) (stating that under
the principles of Title VII, the PDA does not prevent preferential treatment).
190. H.R. REP. No. 95-948, at 4 (1978), reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749, 4752.
191. Id. at 2.
192. See Gloria Allred, Statement to the Press, supra note 20, at 2-3.
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time consuming and costly. In addition, television producers strive for a
high level of authenticity in their productions and incorporating an actress'
pregnancy makes this more difficult to achieve. However, it may be
necessary for the producers to sacrifice some of that authenticity to
provide socially responsible job protection to pregnant actresses.
It is not unprecedented for an entertainment medium to sacrifice a
portion of the production's genuineness in consideration of a more
valuable interest. For example, in the Shakespearean Era, all the major
female roles were played by men or young boys. 9 3 No actresses played in
the public theaters during this time.'94  Sexism was a value that society
placed above the need for authenticity in the theater, and the convention of
the all-male cast did not place significant restraints on Shakespeare's
invention, nor impede the enjoyment by the audience.
195
Similarly, the established star system caused opera to evolve into
race-neutral casting. 196  Singers are chosen as early as five years in
advance of their performance based on reputation, skill, and virtuosity.
197
An appropriate physical characterization is not a criterion for selecting a
star performer. The audience places a higher value on the singer's
individual talent and simply overlooks any inconsistencies between the
character and the performer's physical appearance.
A similar tolerance for pregnancy in the television industry is
possible, even if it requires the medium to slow its quest for virtual reality.
The benefit of women in the workplace and the ability of an actress to be
free of pregnancy discrimination in employment are sufficient to justify
tipping the balance of values in favor of the actress.
193. CECILE DE BANKE, SHAKESPEAREAN STAGE PRODUCTION THEN & Now 115-16
(1954).
194. W. ROBERTSON DAVIES, SHAKESPEARE'S BOY ACTORS 3 (1964).
195. Inconsistencies in gender continue to be disregarded in contemporary Shakespearean
Theatre, but in this case, to promote the value of an all-female cast. The Los Angeles Women's
Shakespeare Company has received critical acclaim for its all-female productions of Romeo and
Juliet, Othello, and Hamlet. The company's production of Richard 111, suggests that authentic
physical appearance is not necessary to a successful theatrical production. "[L]ittle effort [is
made] to hide [the fact] that all [the] actors are female: They don't bind their chests or do much
to their hair, nor do they affect beards. Yet one quickly becomes oblivious to the actors' gender,
because the performances are generally fine and convincing regardless of sex." Lisa D.
Horowitz, Richard III, DAILY VARIETY, Mar. 25, 1996, at 18.
196. See Jeff Bradley, Changing the Cast System; Racial Barriers Crashing on Stage, THE
DENVER POST, May 8, 1994, § A, at F-I; Ethan Mordden, A 'Carousel' Rethought for the Age,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1993, § 2, at 5.
197. ROSANNE MARTORELLA, THE SOCIOLOGY OF OPERA 133, 174 (1982).
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VII. CONCLUSION
Under either the disparate impact or the disparate treatment analysis,
discriminatory firing of a pregnant performer can only be justified if the
actress cannot perform the role for which she was hired. If a court
determines that Spelling was justified in firing Tylo, even though her
pregnancy could clearly be concealed, the precedent will undermine every
woman's right to have a child and retain her job. It is not in society's
interest to disregard the hard-fought battle for equality in the workplace
because the producers of Melrose Place may experience inconvenience. A
holding for Spelling in this case will severely weaken the PDA by
undermining the comprehensive protection against pregnancy
discrimination and diminishing the rigid controls placed on justified
exemptions.
The Tylo case is not merely about one actress who was fired because
she did not time her pregnancy appropriately. It is about sexism in
Hollywood and the discrimination within the entertainment industry.
Allowing pregnancy discrimination based either on a BFOQ standard or
the lesser business necessity standard has disturbing implications about a
woman's value in the workplace: It suggests that an actress is so
dispensable that she must choose between her job or her child. This
conclusion is contradictory to the spirit of the statute, the direction of the
law, and the interests of society. Society benefits when all members are
free to contribute their talents. By placing additional burdens on women
because of their reproductive capacity, this freedom is unnecessarily stifled
and discouraged. As Justice Blackmun stated in Johnson Controls,
"'women as capable of doing their jobs as their male counterparts may not
be forced to choose between having a child and having a job."'
198
Lisa Stolzy
198. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 204 (1991).
* The author would like to thank Professor Catherine L. Fisk of Loyola Law School and
the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Journal. This Comment is
dedicated to Ryan and Adam.
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